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IMPROVING SENIOR LEADER DECISION MAKING IN A COMPLEX, UNCERTAIN WORLD
Perhaps the greatest change, however, is on the ground level with the men and women on the front lines. Young officers and NCOs at the front have always had to make profound life-and-death decisions. In today's conflicts, their responsibilities are even greater and more complex: playing the roles of warrior, diplomat, mayor, economist, city engineer, and tribal liaison -all often at the same time. We must ensure that the kind of mental agility, entrepreneurial spirit, and independent judgment required to be effective downrange carries over into future assignments. operating environment, "…I think it's going to get a whole lot more complex in ways that I don't understand than the opposite. And to go back to where I started which is 22 years ago when I was a commander right down the road here, I had no idea that we'd be living in the world we're living in." 2 As the nation progresses into the 21 Army Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, describes the MDMP as a detailed, deliberate, sequential, and time consuming seven step analytical process that helps commanders and staffs organize thought and make decisions. 15 The MDMP has seven distinct steps consisting of some 42 subordinate tasks, steps and components. 16 These seven steps are illustrated in Figure 1 . terrain, weather, and society to support the MDMP. 19 The civil-military operations staff estimate, for example, must assess societal characteristics that can be diverse and difficult to determine, such as the population's attitudes, economic and infrastructure damage, status and character of the civil government, and ability of local officials to maintain public order. 20 In view of the greater impact and increasing complexity of today's operating environment in which brigade commanders and joint task force commanders must make decisions, the staff cannot adequately know all relevant information and express it to the commander in a meaningful and timely way. As U.S. Marine Corps General Charles
Krulak described in his 1999 seminal article about "strategic corporals" and the "three block war," the military's analytical decision making depends on a high level of situational certainty and accuracy to be effective. Yet, these conditions rarely exist once an enemy is engaged, and the situation becomes fluid and time sensitive. 21 The MDMP addresses risk and views risk management as one way of compensating for the environment's uncertainty. 22 The current version of FM 5-0, however, describes risk as hazards that exist because of the presence of either the enemy or an adversary. As part of the MDMP, risk is characterized by both the probability and severity of a potential loss that may result from the adversary's presence or a hazardous condition. Doctrinally, commanders must manage risk by a five step process, shown in Figure 2 , of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors, and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. 23 In other words, this involves decision making using a five step risk decision making process nested within a seven step decision making process. FM 5-0 suggests commanders compensate for uncertainty and reduce risk by increasing the reconnaissance effort, size of the reserve, speed, precision, or simultaneity of operations. 24 However tactically sound that may be, this view of risk and its reduction does not measure up to the demands of the colonel and brigadier general level decision makers operating in a fast-paced, complex and strategically sensitive environment. The sources of risk to the operation's success are much more than those posed by an enemy force. In Iraq and Afghanistan, political, economic, and societal events and actors can be threats to success. These factors are not as easily identified, understood, anticipated and categorized as MDMP suggests. The emerging concept of design is described in the Army's Draft version of a revised FM 5-0, The Operations Process, as "a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to them." 26 As depicted in Figure 3 , the elements of design, framing the environment, framing the problem and developing an operational approach, 27 are relevant to this paper's examination and could be applied to decision making at the brigade and joint task force level. Today's operational environment presents situations so complex that understanding them -let alone attempting to change them -is beyond the ability of a single individual. Moreover, significant risk occurs when assuming that commanders in the same campaign understand an implicit design concept or that their design concepts will be mutually supporting. The risks multiply, especially when a problem involves multiple units, Services, multinational forces, or other instruments of national power. Commanders mitigate these risks with collaboration and by applying the design fundamentals: applying critical thinking, understand the operational environment, solve the right problem, adapt to dynamic conditions and achieve the designated goals. 29 The emerging concept of design addresses risk in a manner similar to the current construct, but with some significant improvements to the MDMP. One difference is that one of design's early outputs is initial planning guidance, which includes the commander's articulation of acceptable risks. 30 Another advantage to design's emerging doctrine is its fundamental imperative to solve the right problem as one of the methods to mitigate risk. This paper's section on risk management as a method to compensate for uncertainty includes a discussion of the risk of unintended consequences in complex systems. Design's focus on solving the right problem specifically addresses that type of risk by mandating that commanders closely examine the symptoms -the underlying tensions -and the root causes of conflict in the operational environment and consider more accurately how to solve it. 31 If published, Draft FM 5-0's more broadly applicable concept of design could enhance decision making at the brigade and joint task force level. At that tactical level, design cannot replace MDMP, but rather design complements MDMP. Commanders could empower tactical organizations to develop specific and detailed courses of action to change aspects of the environment the commanders determine most relevant by applying design's broad and divergent consideration of factors.
The primary contribution the emerging concept of design can make to benefit brigade and joint task force commanders' decision making is promoting the applicability of the concepts at these lower levels of command. 40 Clausewitz's study of Napoleon's success described the term, still in use today, coup d'oeil as "the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection." 41 More recent studies of intuition maintain the relevance of intuition to decision making in many current contexts, especially a complex military operational environment.
Intuition becomes increasingly valuable precisely because there is so much data. Given the increasing demand on our limited mental capacity, intuition represents a much needed form of cognitive economy. 42 Malcolm Gladwell, author of Blink, would agree.
His second of two lessons on decision making is "frugality matters." Reducing a problem to its simplest elements and recognizing patterns, a key intuition attribute, is essential in decision making. The studies Gladwell examined showed that adding too much data reduced the decision maker's ability to recognize the pattern. new combinations of previously known elements to redefine a problem and its solution nearly simultaneously. 45 Duggan also describes what many researchers refer to a "expert intuition" most often seen in personnel with many years of experience and study in their field who are able to process quickly, even unconsciously, subtle environmental cues and make rapid, accurate judgments. 46 Intuition is a collection of interrelated abilities or skills, which can be executed automatically and seemingly unconsciously. It involves the ability to see deeply, clearly, and holistically. It is capable of seeing the best solution to a problem before finding it. It also includes the ability to grasp immediately the significance and essence of the situation and make instant decisions. It is mostly based on deeply ingrained propensities and heuristics, but it may also reflect a well-informed mind that is agile, fluid and open to all possibilities.
There is a long list of examples of intuition based less on science and evidence and more on "sixth sense" or "gut feelings" which makes it difficult to assess their validity. However, this diversity of definitions has commonalities that are captured well by Dr. Wong's definition of intuition: 47 This paper's context of military decision making includes key aspects of these prominent definitions of intuition: a subconscious processing of environmental cues, rapid recognition of a situation's similarity to previously experienced or studied situations and the development of spontaneous insights that either re-define problems, identify solutions, or both.
As with any decision making process, when using intuition in military decision making it is important to understand its applications and limitations. William Duggan's study of intuition in Army planning acknowledges "coup d'oeil as an educated guess and no more, while analytic methods give a false impression of certainty, completeness and rigor." 48 Duggan contends, contrary to Army Field Manual 5-0, that intuitive decision making is usually faster than analytic decision making, is not limited to experienced leaders, does work well in complex and unfamiliar situations, and it does not overlook more implications than analysis does. 49 In his book, Get There Early, Bob Johansen warns decision makers not to mistake dilemmas (complex situations with multiple bad options for resolution) for problems (which have solutions that can be determined).
Aggressive problem solvers, like the military cultivates, can effectively use analytic methods to solve problems but will make a mess of dilemmas. 50 Several experts agree that the most important aspects of intuition are knowing when to use intuition and achieving the right blend of intuitive and rational analysis.
A more sophisticated approach, such as intuitive decision making, is appropriate for complex situations. 51 In fact, Malcolm Gladwell's first lesson of decision making is that successful decision makers rely on a balance between deliberate and intuitive thinking. Deliberate thinking is a wonderful tool when we have the luxury of time, and the fruits of that type of analysis can set the stage for rapid cognition, an attribute of intuition.
52
Other experts also agree that intuition is not infallible even in simple, easily measured observations 53 and should be considered "the beginnings of inquiry." Intuitive conclusions must be subjected to critical thinking, continued examination, and evaluation of evidence. 54 Dr. Wong advises that we must monitor and reflect upon on intuitive decision making to ensure our unconscious processes serve our conscious needs. 55 If Army leaders accept intuition as a valued contributor to effective decision making, we must look for ways to cultivate it in our future leaders. Being open to the value of intuition, the second area needed to develop intuition, requires leaders to accept the validity of intuition and be self aware enough to look for and heed the signs and signals of intuition, such as discomfort with the status quo and insights that redefine problems. 58 Talula Cartwright's guidebook, "Developing Your
Intuition" points out that leaders must "learn to trust their instincts when critical situations demand quick decisions and when complex problems defy easy answers." 59 The study of history is essential in enlarging the database against which situations can be compared, which is the third way to cultivate intuition in decision makers. Many of descriptions of intuition discussed earlier in this paper included the importance of recognizing the similarities between the current situation and historical examples. General Patton was one of the U.S. Army's most renowned intuitive decision makers and was a famous student of history. General Krulak states a key element of developing intuition is the study of history with an eye toward examining the relevant decision making processes which took place during the particular event. 60 Eugene
Sadler-Smith also highlights the importance of prior learning and experience as the basis for making fast, accurate judgments. 61 The final way to develop intuition in decision makers is through the practice of intuitive decision making and related skills. Some of the intuitive skills General Krulak exhorted his Marines to develop are more thoroughly detailed by other experts, such as Dr. Wong who suggests a focus on observation, speculation, generalization and testing to improve one's intuition. 62 Cartwright promotes journal writing, mental imaging, analytical thinking, and controlling one's emotions under stress. 63 If we know that the effectiveness of intuitive decision making is dependent upon experience, we must seek way to give our Marines that experience. We should recognize decision making as a vitally important combat skill and promote its development throughout our training curriculum -both in our formal schools curricula and in our local unit training programs…Just as we expect a Marine to employ his weapon under combat duress, we must likewise demand that he employ his mind. Marines need to be comfortable with using their intuition under highly stressful circumstances.
Practicing and exercising intuition and rapid, intuitive decision making in difficult circumstances is promoted by almost all experts, but none with as much relevance and eloquence as General Krulak: 64 
Recommendations
To support commanders' ability to make effective decisions in today's complex operating environment, the Army's revised FM 5-0 should expand the concept of design to include applicability down to the brigade level. Commanders at that level can use design's concepts of framing the environment and the problem and developing operational approaches to improve their own cognitive approach to complex situations.
Consequently, this broader perspective and alternate cognitive approach to the situation will enable them to better guide and balance their staffs' analytical MDMP.
The Army should expand the doctrine of Composite Risk Management to include risks associated with unintended consequences. As another rational decision making process, the CRM process could also benefit from leaders who apply design's framework and intuition to the process, again as a guide and counterbalance to the staff's application of the doctrinal process. Applying design's divergent thinking and broad consideration of an operation's potential derailers would result in a more relevant set of threats and, consequently, a better decision and a more thorough plan or order.
Inculcating intuition in our military culture and budding leaders requires a two 
